INTRODUCTION
The transport infrastructure of the countries of Central Europe has been adapted until the end of the 1980s to the economic, social and geopolitical conditions having existed in the Comecon (CMEA) area. Irrespective of the differences in the development levels and the differences in standards (both with respect to the countries of Western Europe, and among the particular countries of the region), this infrastructure largely satisfied the needs arising in that period. After the fall of the iron curtain in 1989 the same infrastructure started to function in entirely new external and internal conditions. It could not stand up to the challenge of these new conditions in many situations, and so its development and modernisation became the priority, upon whose fulfilment the ultimate success of the transformation processes depended. In this context, new and specific barriers were uncovered of an institutional character. The present short report starts with the outline of the new conditions mentioned and the institutional barriers associated with them. Then, five such barriers are characterised in the example of Poland.
Thus, the new internal conditions for the functioning of the transport infrastructure have been formed mainly by:
• The distinct acceleration of the rate of change in the structure of transport activities, both in cargo and passenger transport, consisting in a loss of significance of railways and inland navigation transport, with a simultaneous dynamic increase of importance of car transport, and, though to a lesser degree, of the pipeline and air transport (see Table 1 ).
• The decentralisation and privatisation of the economy, including trade (increase of demand for short-distance cargo transport) and the transport (first of all road transport).
• The decrease of the role of heavy industry, and thus a drop in demand for mass cargo transport. • Significant limitation to job commuting, especially to regional and local centres.
• Very rapid increase of the number of passenger cars.
Out of the total number of 8.1 million new passenger cars that appeared during the period 1990-1999 in Central Europe, as many as 4 million appeared on Polish roads, followed by 1.7 million in Romania.
• Financial difficulties (and the associated decrease of the range and quality of service) of the large state-owned carriers, and not always successful attempt of structural transformations in these enterprises.
On the other hand, the primary external factors were: • Opening up of the borders and the abrupt increase of the border traffic of persons and vehicles. In the period 1990-1997 the cross-border traffic (in both directions) increased from 84.2 million to 273.9 million persons 2 . This dynamic stagnated only a bit later, and • The shift of the main directions of foreign trade and transit; in the majority of the countries of the region in question here the Soviet Union, having occupied the first place as the trade partner, was replaced by the now unified Germany; the subsequent ranks started also to be occupied by other countries of the European Union.
REPORT
In the trade over the eastern direction, first of all raw materials preserved their high position (meaning, therefore, the pipeline and railway transport). After the year 2000, the route Moscow-Warsaw-Berlin lost its position of the most important transit direction in Poland for car transport. Greater transit traffic through Poland is nowadays observed between the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, as well as Finland) and Western Europe (the "Via Baltica" route). The role of transit from Ukraine increased slightly, as well. The lorries from the countries of the former USSR did, as a rule, not observe the load limits and, along with some of the domestic carriers, contributed to the devastation of Polish roads.
• The appearance of competition for the sea and air ports from the side of the similar facilities located in Western Europe; in the first case this applies mainly to Hamburg, Rotterdam and Trieste with respect to servicing of Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary, previously done by the Baltic Sea ports of Gdansk or Szczecin, and in the second case -to the airports in Berlin (for the passengers from western Poland) and in Vienna (for the passengers from Slovakia and western Hungary); the evidence is provided by the share of 14% taken by the border crossing on the route Warsaw-Berlin in the total value of Polish imports from the United States.
• Taking up of the membership negotiations with the European Union and the inclusion in the system of European transport corridors (TINA); adoption of the corridor system as the one in force in a way predefines the future investment priorities (possibilities of cofinancing from the European funds).
As mentioned before, the existing transport infrastructure was as a rule not capable of matching these new conditions. The broadly conceived institutional infrastructure, directly and indirectly influencing transport, has not been adapted to the new conditions, either. The state of infrastructure lagged behind the quickly developing economy -in the years 1994-1999 -and the changes in the lifestyles of a large part of the population. The transport system turned out to be little elastic 3 when confronted with the transformation-induced changes. Due to the lack of adaptation to the new socio-economic and political situation, the transport infrastructure became a brake for economic growth. In accordance with the results of studies conducted at the University of Wrocaw, among the foreign investors, who located their capital in Poland, as much as 68% of the companies accounted for in the study, mentioned the access to modern road infrastructure as the key location factor 4 .
Among the specific institutional barriers, which were uncovered in the course of development of transport in the period of transformation, we should mention here: (a) Lack of consistency in the transport policy of the State, involving lack of concentration of means on the explicitly adopted transport policy (commented upon further on), (b) Inertia of the spatial development plans in the domain of infrastructural development (commented upon further on), (c) Inertia in functioning of the large state-owned carrier companies -lack of subsidies, coupled with simultaneous lack of essential restructuring changes or with errors committed when undertaking such changes, (d) The excess liberalisation of the procedures in the domain of protesting against and blocking the investment projects by the local social groups, (e) Little flexible policy in the domain of improvement of road safety.
The majority of the barriers mentioned negatively affect the drive towards the broadly understood sustainability of transport development. The lack of implementation decisions in the domain of transport projects (including road construction projects), caused by the situation arising from the presence of barriers, given the simultaneous enormous (and not limited in any institutional manner) growth of the number of passenger cars, and given the lack of a resolute support for public transport, meant actually a practice that is contrary to the idea of sustainability. Even the impact of the apparently "pro-ecological" legal actions undertaken by groups protesting against individual investment projects cannot be seen in this context as unequivocally positive. Such protests are namely most often quite local, and their objective is to push the nuisance associated with transport away to neighbouring areas.
LACK OF STRATEGIC CONCEPT
A lot of successive documents and Governmental strategies concerning transport policies have been elaborated in the majority of countries of Central Europe, including Poland. They outlined the plans for the development of transport in the period until the year 2010 or even 2020 5, 6 . Most of them though, were commonly criticised by the scholarly community 7 , in particular -for the lack of internal consistency and the postulative character. The designs fell short of indicating concrete sources for financing of the postulated investment projects. Likewise, the unequivocal indication of investment priorities was lacking, an element necessary in conditions of constant financial problems. At the same time, during the 1990s, the State derived undoubtedly an important revenue accruing from the development of car transport (in various direct forms, like through customs tariffs, high excise tax on fuel, road tax, registration fees, driving license fees, etc., and the indirect ones, e.g. through taxation on firms producing cars and car accessories). According to the estimates elaborated for the area of the European Union in the middle of the 1990s 8 , the total revenues from road tolls and taxes paid by the road users were more than twice as high as the sums disbursed on construction and maintenance of roads. Such analyses have not been carried out in Poland, but given the low outlays into the development of road infrastructure, the analogous ratio is certainly even more disadvantageous. Yet, during the same period the countries of the Union spent significant means on the more ecological forms of transport (first of all development of railroad transport and inland navigation), while the outlays on such purposes were in Poland severely limited.
There are no regulations that would force nowadays the state budget to devote any (even the smallest) part of the revenues on the development and modernisation of transport infrastructure. In the middle of the 1990s the road tax was included in the fuel price. A part of it ends up in the communes in the form of a road subsidy, to be then most often spent on local administration, or, alternatively, on education or health care. The numerous hikes of the excise tax were mainly meant to increase the state revenue. On the other hand, the sole true justification for the hikes would be the obligatory use of the revenue thus obtained for the transport-oriented investments.
In other words, the limited volume of financial means ought to lead to a univocal definition of a direction in the state transport policy. This can be one of two directions:
• The European variant, with the clearly defined preference for "environmentally friendly" transport forms (investment into the development of railways and public transport in towns), higher degree of regulation and high taxation on fuels; • The American variant, with the preserved position of the passenger car as the basis for satisfaction of transport needs by households (investment first of all into the road infrastructure), lower degree of regulation and lower taxation on fuel (partly after Rietveld P., Stough R. 9 ).
The lack of univocal adoption of definite concepts results partly from the enormous social expenditure burden on the state budget, which, on the one hand, does not allow for the giving up of significant revenues that the development of car transport brought, and on the other -leaves no room for an effective investment policy.
It is also disadvantageous that the decision process concerning particular undertakings related to transport infrastructure is situated at the parliamentary level. When enacting the budget, MPs vote on the transfer of means from one concrete project to another (see, e.g. the issue of the subsidies for the construction of a subway in Warsaw, showing up at the occasion of every budgetary debate). Striving to achieve the budgetary consensus is therefore conducive to the further partitioning of the means, which are anyway limited at the very start.
The situation having emerged assumes a special significance in view of the possibility that Poland would take advantage of the structural funds of the European Union. The threat appears, namely, that these means will be used to realise individual fragments of various kinds of networks, which would not at all be equivalent to the sustainable development of the infrastructure system as a whole.
In the conditions of lack of internal strategic concepts the development of infrastructure may become to an excessive degree the object of uniquely pan-European policy. Yet, the unified treatment of the entire territory of the European Union (EU-27) is, in the context of the premises for the transport policy, potentially disadvantageous for Poland and for other new members of the Union. Numerous documents and reports 10 show a dis-tinct shift in the weight of the recommendations submitted from the planning of new investment projects in infrastructure towards the activities aimed at a better use of the already existing infrastructure. This amounts, over a longer-term perspective, to a threat for the support from the European Union for the realisation of the main and necessary investment projects in the region. The postulate of a better use of the existing infrastructure is, naturally, well justified, but it cannot become the substitute for the evening out of the disproportion existing in the density of the modern transport networks between old and new EU members.
INERTIA OF SPATIAL PLANNING
Since the beginning of the period of socio-economic transformations the necessity was being emphasised in Poland of the rapid improvement of the road infrastructure, including, first of all, construction of motorways and expressways. No effort was made, however, when elaborating the motorway construction program, of changing the former concepts of the fundamental pattern of the main international and domestic infrastructural connections (see Figure 1) . The program mentioned was, in fact, a repetition of the plans prepared in the 1960s and 1970s, which stemmed from the conviction of the key significance of the connections between the centres of heavy industry (Upper Silesia) and the seaports (North-South routes), and from the considerations related to the collaboration within the framework of the former CMEA (international routes, with priority on transit). The priorities of that time did not include, though, the satisfaction of the internal demand, and thus also of the individual demand for transport. Characteristically, the setting referred to has largely been accepted by the European Union. The corridor system of CEMT/TINA corresponds in a general outline to the Polish program of motorway construction. The sole significant exception is constituted by the Via Baltica route, ensuring the linkage of the Baltic states with the European transport system, without the necessity of crossing the borders of the third countries.
In spite of the fact that the official basis for the elaboration of the program of motorway construction was constituted by the studies of the current and forecasted road traffic, there is in reality an inconsistency between the planned course of routes and the course of routes fea- , and on fragments of the meridional route. Besides, a similar, and in some places even higher, intensity appeared on the exit routes from the Warsaw agglomeration, which were not included in the construction program mentioned (see Figure 2 ). The forecasts of traffic intensity assume, as well, its highest increase on exactly the same routes 12 . Thus, Poland became one of the few countries of the region, and also of the entire Europe, in which the planned pattern of the new infrastructure was not based upon the star-shaped model with the centre in the country's capital (like in France, United Kingdom, Hungary, and numerous other countries). Similarly, the internal structure of foreign trade (like the share of individual provinces in exports) and the spatial distribution of the border traffic demonstrate that in conditions of the 1990s the highest importance in terms of transport should be attached to the parallel connections, followed by the diagonal ones, and only then -to the meridional connections. Since the most developed core of the European Union exerts nowadays beyond doubt the strongest economic influence on Poland within the continental scale, the economic associations and hence also the infrastructural needs are oriented in its direction. That is why the central parallel corridor, stretching between The Netherlands and Moscow, "collects" in its consecutive large transport nodes (Berlin, Poznań , Warsaw, Brest', Minsk) the diagonal connections, inclined towards the West, stretching out both to the North and to the South. Therefrom, the modern transport system (including exactly the motorway network) of the country should to a lesser degree refer to the chessboard setting (conform, by the way, to the McLean's network model of the 1930s, meant in fact for the colonies), and much more to the hexagonal setting 13 .
The lack of adaptation of the setting of planned routes to internal demand (and to some extent also to the international one) was one of the reasons of failure of the entire program of motorway construction. Initially, Polish motorways were to be constructed in the BOT system. The construction consortia (and the subsequent operators) were offered the opportunity of constructing little profitable segments of the motorways. Only one route (A-2, a fragment of the Warsaw-Berlin corridor) is being currently stage-wise put to use (at the end of the year 2004 the middle segment of 150km of length was functioning). The concessionnaire, however, gave up the realisation of several local nodes, which deprived the inhabitants of a couple of towns of the possibility of using the motorway. In case of the second project the state was forced to change the principles of financing (granting the direct investor the guarantee of covering the losses in case the traffic is lower than forecasted). At the same time, work was started on the elaboration of the legal bases for the public-private partnership in the realisation of the remaining segments. The largest investment project carried out in the past decade (the motorway WrocawGliwice) was constructed entirely with the state-disbursed and European means.
The here described inertia of spatial planning ap plies also to other transport means. Moreover, it appears on both the national and local scale. The last segment of the currently constructed underground line in Warsaw leads -conforming to the plans of the 1950s -to the metal works that are losing their economic significance altogether. The inertia directly affects also the problem of sustainable transport development, of interest for us here. It is often so that the investment project designs are not being corrected even in situations, which are evident from the point of view of nature protection. This was, for instance, the case of the already constructed motorway The causes for this inertia should be sought in the financial shortages (in some places in the previous period the initial capital costs were already borne, like for land purchase), and in the fact that making of changes in the development plans is a risky undertaking for the politicians. Thus, even carrying out of investment projects, for which land was secured since 40 years, encounters social protests (from, e.g., persons, who settled in the 1990s in the direct neighbourhood of the planned project, and assumed that the motorway would never in fact be built). In case of implementation of entirely new designs, the situation is as a rule, even more difficult.
INERTIA IN THE FUNCTIONING AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE PUBLIC CARRIERS
It is commonly held that the bad condition of the large-scale public carriers in Poland (and first and foremost of the state railways -PKP) and the degradation of the railway transport is due to the drastic cutting of the budgetary subsidies. In practice, though, an enormous impact was due to the decreasing demand for transport services of both cargo (particularly of mass transport) and passengers. Moreover, there was an obvious positive feedback between the decreasing demand and limitation of subsidies (and the associated increase of transport rates). It is often noted that among the factors conditioning the Polish car ownership boom the change in the relation between the prices of fuel and fares in public transport was one of the most important ones. Thus, in 1989 the average monthly net wage bought 291 railway tickets for the distance of 100km or 465 litres of gas, while in 1998, respectively, only 118 such tickets and 549 litres of gas 14 .
The policy in the domain of restructuring of railways (PKP) was aimed during the entire period of transformation at the short-sighted and defensive economic objectives and was conducted largely under the influence of the trade unions. The strategic objective was to achieve positive financial effects and to preserve the enormous employment numbers, and not to modernise the network and gain new markets. The actions aimed at the attainment of this objective consisted in liquidation of train connections, increase of fares and sale of the estate owned. The success was limited. The excess employment was not liquidated, and the enterprise found itself in extraordinarily large debts. Actually, the subsidies were preserved, and only changed their form to the so-called un-debting. The primary problem of the railways in Poland consists in the fact that the interests of state and society are not identical with the interests of the PKP company 15 , and nowadays it is not identical with the interests of the companies that emerged after the division of the PKP. At the same, time these companies benefited from gigantic subsidies absorbed to a very high degree by the payroll and only marginally disbursed for investments. The railways salvage themselves by selling land and buildings. This, though, is of course a short-term policy. It is admitted that the adopted form of restructuring does not provide the proper conditions for true competition on the railway transport market 7 .
Other kinds of errors have been committed during the restructuring of the coach transport company PKS (the fact of practical withdrawal of the state car transport from the cargo transport segment -current share of the market being at less than 1% -should be considered natural). The breakdown into 167 independent regional units, however, brought about an excessive partitioning of the company. In the course of this process the specific features of the individual branches of the PKS company had not been accounted for, which resulted in the polarisation of the situation of the newly emerging enterprises (some of them having faced bankruptcy 16 ). Besides, rapid privatisation has not followed this drastic decentralisation. It must be emphasised, though, that the negative effects of the restructuring activities in road transport on the scale of the country are incomparably smaller than in the case of railway transport. The state-owned businesses can (and even ought to) be replaced in this case with ease by private enterprises, and the downfall of the former does not directly entail the loss of value of the very transport infrastructure (it has mainly an economic character).
EXCESS LIBERALISATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF PROTESTING AGAINST INVESTMENT PROJECTS
The issue of the so-called "social protests" against the transport-related investment projects has not been until recently a subject of scientific study in Poland. This issue is not a homogeneous one. It is possible, generally, to distinguish three groups of actors taking part in the pro-tests. These are:
-private persons or their groups, -self-governmental units, -other bodies, including, first of all, organisations and associations (including, in particular, the more or less genuine ecological organisations). Protests are channelled through both the judicial court procedures and through the lobbying oriented at the selfgovernmental or central authorities, as well as by the intermediary of the media. In case of private persons it is also quite frequent that physical obstruction is carried out by withstanding the right-of-way estate purchase procedure. Besides, it is reasonable, from the point of view of planning, to distinguish the protests against:
-investment projects placed for many years already in the development plans of a given area, -investment projects currently being introduced (or meant to be introduced) into the respective plans.
Both the subjects and the objects of the protests should be considered as important in the evaluation of the social and legal justification of the protests. Thus, the protests of the self-governmental units against the new central plans (or the plans of the superior level units) as well as those of the private persons against the new plans of the self-governmental units of the lowest level (communes) should be considered as most legitimate. Yet, in Polish conditions a vast proportion of the protest activities are oriented against the undertakings that have been planned already decades ago (like, for instance, the route of the A-2 motorway through Warsaw, for which the land has been reserved since the 1970s). The subjects of these protests are often the organisations and associations that have no formal warrant for representing local communities. In the extreme cases the activities of such organisations have a corruptive character.
The attitude of self-government with respect to the transport related investment projects is often indiscriminate (according to a study from 2002 as much as 62.5% of the communes see an improvement of accessibility in the modernisation of the expressways -Judge E. Et al., 2004) , which means that the role of protesters is taken over by the organisations not having any democratic representation.
The escalation of protests is undoubtedly also due to the negligence of the investors in terms of observation of legal and technical procedures. It appears also that an important role is played by the lack of an ultimate arbitrator as to the estate price in case of the impossibility of striking a deal between the owner and the unit carrying out land purchase for the purpose of an investment project. The potential appeals from the decisions of such a body, to be carried out through courts, should not delay taking over the land and realisation of the project (further decisions may have a financial aspect, but ought not concern the very fact of purchase). In this context it should also be emphasised that the low capacity of the court system in Poland constitutes an institutional barrier for the effective development of transport infrastructure.
LOW FLEXIBILITY OF POLICY IN THE DOMAIN OF IMPROVEMENT OF ROAD TRAFFIC SAFETY
An important increase of road traffic was one of the reasons for introducing changes in the Road Traffic Law and in other regulations pertaining to car traffic and to the parking systems. These changes have been introduced in Poland with a significant delay. Thereby, mass development of private car ownership and car transport took place in Poland in conditions of validity of numerous regulations from the period of the 1970s and 1980s, when the number of cars on the road was several times smaller.
There were 51,000 road accidents in Poland in 2003, in which 5,600 persons were killed. Thus, while the number of accidents is not significantly different from the numbers noted in the countries of Western Europe, the number of persons killed remains disproportionately high 17 . It is considered that the causes of this state of affairs include:
-lower quality of cars on the road, including the fact that at the same time very old and brand new cars are on the road (featuring very different technical capacities), -worse quality of the road infrastructure, -high proportion of relatively new drivers, -low level of social acceptance for some regulations of the Road Traffic Law.
An institutional constraint is constituted by the minimally flexible and spatially indiscriminate policy in the domain of traffic regulations. An example is provided by the non-differentiated speed limitation in individual localities crossed by roads of national importance (a commonly applied system in Western Europe). Until as late as 2004 the speed limit within the urbanised areas was relatively high, namely 60km/h. In Europe the most common in Europe speed limit of 50km/h was introduced on almost all roads, including thruways in large towns. A clearly negative influence is also exerted by the currently functioning system of driver training, in which the main emphasis is placed on parking manoeuvres, and not on driving in intensive traffic and at high speeds.
Let us indicate, though, that in the 1980s and at the beginning of the transformation, the development of car transport brought about a proportional increase in the number of accidents and associated casualties. Later on, however, the situation underwent an essential change (see Figure 3 ). The numbers of accidents stabilised, while the number of passenger cars was still quickly increasing. This was due to a gradual replacement of cars by the newer ones, and also to more rigorous regulations concerning, in particular, safety equipment and its use (safety belts, child restraint devicies) and driving under the influence of alcohol (such an event being treated as a crime). An integrated programme of improvement of road safety GAMBIT was introduced in 1996, with the aim of reducing the number of persons killed in road accidents down to 4,000 per annum by the year 2010 18 . It can, also, be expected that further positive effects of the new regulations will appear with a certain delay.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
During the entire period of systemic transformation the role of the barriers outlined here has not been curbed. It can be postulated that it is partly because of this fact that the years of rapid economic development of Poland (1994-2000) have not been adequately used for the expansion of transport infrastructure (and for improvement of safety in road traffic). In the opinion of Taylor 7 , these years were wasted in terms of the capacities of Polish transport. Consequently, in the year 2004 Poland became a member of the European Union with an infrastructure not much different from the one we had in 1989. Moreover, a part of this infrastructure underwent significant wear. This puts Poland in a worse position than the majority of the remaining new member countries. The progress in road construction (including motorways) was over the last 15 years distinctly greater in Hungary, Slovakia, Bohemia, and even in the Baltic states (especially if we take into account the surface area and the demographic potential of these countries). At the same time, it is held that the differences in accessibility between Western Europe and Central-Eastern Europe will remain significant even after the re-integration of the Eastern European transport networks 19 . This will occur despite the official declarations that modernisation of infrastructure should contribute to closing the gap between Poland and the old members of the European Union 20 .
This bears a negative impact on the competitiveness of the Polish region, especially those situated far from the few existing segments of the modern road or railway infrastructure. The first effects of such a situation were the vain attempts of winning the locations for investment projects in the car industry (lost to Czechia and Slovakia). While until the end of the 1990s the key factor for the location of foreign investments was the magnitude of the market and the labour cost, we are observing now a visible increase of importance of the transport accessibility element. Conforming to the results of a study conducted at the University of Wrocaw among foreign investors, as much as 68% of companies approached mentioned as a key location factor the access to modern road infrastructure 4 .
It is not easy to overcome the barriers outlined here, since it would require, in the majority of cases, law-making activity. It was demonstrated that the sources of the constraints on development lie to an extent outside of the transport sector itself. They reach, in particular, the very foundations of the system of distribution of budgetary means and the incapacity of the court system. A significant degree of political influence on the problem of development of infrastructure should also be assessed very negatively.
The structural funds of the European Union constitute beyond any doubt an opportunity for the Polish transport infrastructure. This opportunity is not only based on subsidising future investment projects, but it is, of enormous significance from the point of view of unclogging the decision-making system, responsibility of the decision-makers and the potential social pressure. The possibility of not using (or wasting) the funds meant for the development of infrastructure will have a definitely different political aspect when there would be no way of disbursing these means for some other ("socially appropriate") goal.
